



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

# **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

## **ADOPTED IN 2025**

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# TAKING NATO DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE TO THE NEXT LEVEL AT THE HAGUE SUMMIT DECLARATION 496\*

The Assembly,

1. **Stressing** that NATO remains the indispensable cornerstone of all Allies' security and that, for 76 years, it has guaranteed the security of both Europe and North America;
2. **Underlining** that NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept outlines a security environment marked by strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks, and identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and terrorism as the most direct asymmetric threat;
3. **Reiterating** its firm condemnation of Russia's unprovoked, full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine which poses a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;
4. **Reaffirming** its unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, right to self-defence and self-determination, including its irreversible path towards full NATO membership;
5. **Convinced** that a strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and **welcoming** efforts to bring about a fair and lasting peace that provides for Ukraine's long-term security;
6. **Clear-eyed** about the multiple and systemic challenges the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values as well as to the rules-based international order;
7. **Deplored** the growing and destabilising collusion between autocratic regimes in Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Belarus;
8. **Deplored** the growing presence of destabilising actors under Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in the Southern Neighbourhood, including the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa;
9. **Welcoming** the important decisions taken to address the entire set of threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security at the 2022, 2023 and 2024 Summits, which mark a step change and a new baseline for a radically enhanced NATO deterrence and defence posture;
10. **Underlining** the ironclad commitments to the unique transatlantic bond and collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty;
11. **Stressing** that the NATO defence spending target of 2% of GDP — and any future agreed-upon increases — is not an optional requirement, but an obligation to the citizens of the Alliance;
12. **Highlighting** the significant progress achieved in defence spending, including an increase of more than USD 700 billion in European and Canadian defence spending since 2014 and a 20% increase in 2024, as well as the ongoing outstanding contribution of the United States;
13. **Welcoming** several Allies' announcement to increase defence spending significantly;
14. **Stressing** that, in line with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, to respond to an unprecedented set of threats and challenges, Allies must ensure defence plans are fully resourced and deliver

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\* Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Dayton, Ohio, United States on Monday 26 May 2025

significant new capabilities, which requires substantial and across-the-board increases in defence spending;

15. **Acknowledging** that all NATO Allies understand the importance of increasing their respective share of responsibility for transatlantic security;

16. **Welcoming** recent European efforts, including within the framework of the European Union, to accelerate the mobilisation of the necessary instruments and financing in order to bolster transatlantic security;

17. **Stressing** the need for Allies, in line with the Preamble and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to constrain, counter and contest authoritarian powers' attacks against democracy and the rules-based international order, and to prevent the Alliance's strength from being undermined by trade barriers among Allies;

18. **Welcoming** Allies' and NATO's strengthened response to these authoritarian powers' campaign of hybrid operations targeting Allies, saluting, in particular, the prompt launch of Baltic Sentry and establishment of NATO Task Force X to strengthen the protection of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, including against the Russian shadow fleet;

19. **Stressing** that The Hague Summit must now take NATO's deterrence and defence to the next level, rebalance the United States', Canada's and Europe's respective roles in support of Euro-Atlantic security and enhance the Alliance's collective and Allies' national resilience;

20. **Recognising** that NATO's partnerships remain vital to enhance stability, contribute to international peace and security, and uphold the rules-based international order; **reaffirming** their essential role in supporting NATO's three core tasks and the Alliance's 360-degree approach to security; and **underlining** in particular the strategic importance of NATO's Southern Neighbourhood in light of the persistent and interconnected challenges emanating from the region, including terrorism, hybrid threats, irregular migration, and state fragility, as well as the opportunities for enhanced cooperation with Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and African partners;

21. **Noting** that Georgia, a candidate country for Euro-Atlantic integration, is currently undergoing an accelerated process of democratic decline;

22. **Reiterating** the importance of stability and peace in the Western Balkans and **expressing** its serious concern about the latest legislation and initiatives in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina that undermine and threaten the country's constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial and functional integrity, as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement signed 30 years ago;

23. **Convinced** that NATO's strength and credibility lies in the unity, cohesion and resolve of Allies and **affirming** its determination to continue to support a strong Alliance through parliamentary dialogue, as it has done for the past 70 years;

24. **Recognising** both civil and military dimensions of defence planning as mutually necessary and beneficial when building resilient societies;

25. **Recalling** that, building on the Defence Production Action Plan agreed at the Vilnius Summit in 2023, at the NATO Summit 2024 Allies committed to doing more together as Allies, including to strengthen defence industry across the Alliance, and agreed the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge (NICE);

26. **URGES** Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit meeting in The Hague:

- a. to agree on a Transatlantic Deterrence Initiative through which Allies will commit to stepping up efforts to rebalance Allied contributions to transatlantic security, with individual Allies reconsidering their share of responsibility and adjusting it to match the reality of a contested threat environment;
- b. to commit to the implementation of ambitious capability targets which will ensure NATO is fit for purpose today and for the long term in order to be prepared for high-intensity and multi-domain collective defence;
- c. to reinforce NATO's posture in the Baltic Sea region, including by strengthening the Air Policing and Baltic Sentry missions, towards a credible forward defence posture aligned with NATO's New Force Model;
- d. to agree on a Hague Defence Investment Pledge including an ambitious new defence spending target well beyond 2% of GDP, in order to ensure that Allies deliver the capabilities needed to remedy existing shortfalls, to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to commit to urgently develop national plans to meet this new target;
- e. to commit to provide the necessary forces, capabilities, resources, and infrastructure for existing Allied defence plans;
- f. to continue to ensure NATO retains a modern, credible, effective, safe and secure nuclear deterrent mission which is the cornerstone of Alliance security;
- g. to further modernise and increase the capabilities, readiness, scalability and integration of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single points of failure and ensure full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the proliferation of ballistic missiles through the full development of NATO Ballistic Missile Defence;
- h. to continue to bolster Allied space capabilities, plans and procedures;
- i. to recognise and treat space-based infrastructure, as well as corresponding supply chains, as critical infrastructure, and apply lessons learned from other sectors to enhance its safety, protection, and resilience;
- j. to continue implementing cyberspace as an operational domain throughout peacetime, crisis and conflict by strengthening cyber deterrence, defence and cooperation across the Alliance, including by speeding up plans to operationalise the NATO Integrated Cyber Defence Centre (NICC);
- k. to continue to foster and strengthen cooperation in countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, which constitutes the most asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity;
- l. to expand NATO-led efforts and funding under the NATO Security Investment Programme to develop critical military infrastructure across Central and Eastern Europe, including support for the Eastern Shield initiative and the Baltic Defence Line, enhancing defensive capabilities and interoperability along NATO's Eastern Flank, thus improving the Alliance's overall readiness and capacity for rapid deployment and sustained defence operations;

- m. to deliver on NATO's recent defence innovation initiatives and agree on an ambitious Rapid Adoption Action Plan to advance NATO's technological edge by speeding up the adoption of innovative technologies;
- n. to step up work with industry to accelerate the development and delivery of critical capabilities, including through large scale, multinational procurement;
- o. to adopt a plan to increase and strengthen the implementation of NATO standards to enhance interoperability and interchangeability;
- p. to further strengthen NATO's partnerships, in line with the 2024 Washington Summit Declaration, by adopting a more strategic and result-oriented approach to engagement with partners, particularly in NATO's Southern Neighbourhood where the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Southern Neighbourhood should be strengthened to enhance trust, visibility and cooperation;
- q. to further leverage cooperation with the European Union, in particular to support increased European defence spending and capability development as well as to closely cooperate on military mobility and logistics, including secure and resilient energy supplies to the military;
- r. to increase cooperation with like-minded partners to enhance the security of supply chains, support the development of key capabilities and adoption of innovative technologies;
- s. to further leverage cooperation with Ukraine to identify and apply lessons from Russia's war of aggression, primarily through the Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC), to enhance NATO's ability to adapt its deterrence and defence posture and increase Ukraine's interoperability with NATO;
- t. to sustain and increase diplomatic, military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine, to both address its immediate needs and strengthen its position at the negotiating table;
- u. to recommit to the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine and to make full use of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the NATO-Ukraine Council, the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), JATEC, the NATO Representation in Ukraine, and other instruments to support Ukraine now and for the long term;
- v. to agree a revised strategy for countering hybrid warfare, which further increases the Alliance's and Allies' resilience to Russia's and other authoritarian powers' destabilisation campaigns while imposing costs to deter and defend against further attacks;
- w. to continue to constrain and contest Russia's aggressive actions and to counter its ability to conduct destabilising activities against NATO and Allies;
- x. to reinforce and communicate an accurate and credible narrative of NATO's steadfast commitment to freedom, security, and democracy, stepping up efforts to counter information manipulation and interference by foreign actors, as well as the spread of disinformation through traditional and social media – activities aimed at creating confusion, deepening societal divisions, destabilising democratic institutions, and ultimately weakening the Alliance;

- y. to continue boosting Allied resilience to China's systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security, including by reducing strategic dependencies, investing in cyber defences and working with partners of the Alliance, particularly the EU and like-minded Indo-Pacific partners, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;
- z. to continue to strengthen the protection of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), and enhance Allied ability to deter, detect and respond to threats, including through NATO's Centre for Security of CUI, NATO's Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network and NATO Task Force X;
- aa. to operationalise NATO's commitment to defending shared democratic values by directing the establishment of a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters;
- bb. to reiterate the strategic importance of the Black Sea Region for transatlantic security, continued support to Allied regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region including, as appropriate, through the 1936 Montreux Convention, as well as strengthen NATO's posture and regional readiness along the Eastern Flank, from the Black Sea to the Baltic area;
- cc. to reduce and eliminate, as appropriate, obstacles to defence trade and investment among Allies;
- dd. to continue their commitment to security and stability in the Western Balkans, support reconciliation across the region, and enhance assistance to regional partners in countering malign influences;
- ee. to keep up pressure on Russia by backing the ramping up and effective enforcement of sanctions against it and its accomplices, particularly in the oil and gas sector – including the Russian shadow fleet – as well as metallurgy and the banking and financial sectors;
- ff. to encourage Allies to develop and adapt policies that enable a greater flow of investment and technology among Allies, thereby facilitating the rapid enhancement of defence and deterrence capabilities and capacities across the Alliance.

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## PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN UKRAINE

### DECLARATION 497\*

The Assembly,

1. **Reiterating** its condemnation of Russia's unprovoked and brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, for which Russia bears sole responsibility, and **denouncing** Russia's unacceptable attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, which have continued despite pledges to cease fire;
2. **Reaffirming** its unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and right to self-defence and self-determination, including its NATO membership path;
3. **Expressing** profound respect and admiration for the remarkable bravery, resilience and resolve of the people, the democratic institutions and the armed and security forces of Ukraine;
4. **Denouncing** the assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean regimes to Russia's war of aggression;
5. **Highlighting** that Russia's war against Ukraine is also a critical test of the collective resilience of democracies and that by supporting Ukraine, Allies also protect their own security and shared democratic values;
6. **Stressing** that the outcome of this war will shape the future European and international order and set a precedent that will influence the future actions and strategic calculations of Russia, China and other enablers of Russia's war against Ukraine, as well as those of other malign actors;
7. **Welcoming** efforts by the United States, in dialogue and consultation with European Allies and Canada, to bring about a just and lasting peace that provides for Ukraine's and Europe's long-term security, **saluting as well** efforts initiated by France and the United Kingdom to build a "coalition of the willing" to provide a reassurance force in support of peace, and **convinced** that transatlantic unity is essential to achieving and securing any sustainable agreement;
8. **Emphasising** that only a peace through strength can lead to lasting peace;
9. **Stressing** that there can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, and that all those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of international law, human rights and international humanitarian law;
10. **Convinced** that a strong and independent Ukraine with robust, modernised, coherent, and well-equipped armed forces, capable of deterring and defending against future aggression, is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area;
11. **Stressing therefore** that any negotiated solution includes robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression;
12. **Welcoming** Allies' ongoing robust and vital financial and military assistance, which is critical to Ukraine's immediate and long-term defence needs and that will aid and support long-term European security;

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\* Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Dayton, Ohio (United States) on Monday 26 May 2025.

13. **Welcoming** all EU initiatives supporting Ukraine, including the new EU Security Action for Europe instrument, which should be employed to the fullest extent in order to accelerate and scale up Ukrainian military production;

14. **Saluting** NATO's political and practical support for Ukraine, particularly through the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), the NATO Representation in Ukraine (NRU), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), and other instruments to support Ukraine now and for the long term;

15. **Reaffirming** its readiness and determination to support Ukraine's further democratic consolidation, which brings it closer to NATO membership, including through the NATO PA special fund to support Ukraine's democracy;

16. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to sustain and increase diplomatic, military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine, to both address its immediate civilian and battlefield needs and strengthen its position at the negotiating table;
- b. to continue to work towards fairer burden sharing among all Allies across all types of assistance to Ukraine;
- c. to continue to step up and speed up the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine and to urgently ramp up Allied and Ukrainian defence industrial capacity and production, including through direct investments into Ukraine's domestic defence industrial base, notably via direct purchases from Ukrainian defence companies to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
- d. to continue to train and equip the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strengthen Ukraine's long-term deterrence and defence posture;
- e. to keep up pressure on Russia by backing the ramping up and effective enforcement of sanctions against it and its accomplices, particularly in the oil and gas sector, including the Russian shadow fleet, as well as the banking and financial sectors;
- f. to maintain and bolster transatlantic unity in the pursuit of peace through strength in Ukraine;
- g. to welcome the Summit recently hosted by Türkiye in Istanbul;
- h. to work together and with Ukraine to ensure that any agreement deters future Russian aggression, guarantees Ukraine's long-term security, and strengthens European and Euro-Atlantic security;
- i. to support efforts to put together a multinational reassurance force to help guarantee a future peace agreement;
- j. to reiterate their longstanding position that they will never recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories;
- k. to reaffirm all elements of the July 2024 Washington Summit declaration and NATO-Ukraine Council Statement, and make full use of all of NATO's fora and instruments in support of Ukraine to deepen political consultation, bolster Ukraine's self-defence,

transition Ukraine to full interoperability with NATO, and continue bringing Ukraine closer to eventual membership;

- I. to invite Ukraine to participate in the NATO Summit in The Hague and hold a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council at the level of Heads of State and government;
- m. to reaffirm that Ukraine's future NATO membership is a sovereign decision of Ukraine and the NATO Allies alone, based solely on the will of the Ukrainian people and authorities and the fulfilment of membership criteria, and to reiterate that no third party – including the Russian Federation – can have a veto over NATO membership;
- n. to set NATO assistance to Ukraine on a sustainable footing by recommitting to the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, and providing sustainable funding and speeding up the delivery of funds for the Comprehensive Assistance Package and NSATU trust funds;
- o. to further leverage JATEC to identify and apply lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine and increase Ukraine's interoperability with NATO;
- p. to increase cooperation with Ukraine and its defence industry on technology innovation, including by implementing joint activities to support Ukraine's self-defence via such initiatives as the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap;
- q. to bring Ukraine's defence procurement further in line with Euro-Atlantic best practices, including through the Strategic Defence Procurement Review process;
- r. to continue to use the NUC format, to the fullest extent, for advancing Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, for discussing issues of common security and as a crisis consultation mechanism;
- s. to step up cooperation with the Assembly in support of Ukraine;
- t. to allow for engagement between the NUC and the Assembly on the parliamentary dimension of the NATO-Ukraine relationship;
- u. to continue to strengthen the NRU;
- v. to designate a liaison officer in the NRU to work with the Assembly to support capacity-building efforts for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
- w. to fully support Ukraine's path of democratic reform, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a platform for sharing resources and exchanging best practices as well as by helping Ukraine implement its adapted Annual National Programme;
- x. to work on an ambitious long-term plan for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, including by developing legal frameworks to allow for the full use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's reconstruction based on international law and the principle that the aggressor must pay for the consequences of its aggression;
- y. to welcome the Fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2025), due to be co-hosted by Italy and Ukraine in Rome in July 2025, aimed at mobilising international support for Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, reform, and modernisation, as well as to acknowledge the results of the previous conferences held in Lugano (2022), London (2023), and Berlin (2024).

# BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIETIES TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

## RESOLUTION 498\*

The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** that the defence of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law is enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty, and that democratic resilience is a pillar of collective security;
2. **Highlighting** that foreign interference aims to threaten the stability, cohesion and democratic functioning of Allied societies, and that Euro-Atlantic deterrence and defence are intrinsically linked to democratic resilience;
3. **Deploring** that the Russian Federation has intensified its campaign of aggressive hybrid actions against Allies, directly and through proxies, across the Euro-Atlantic area;
4. **Warning** that other authoritarian states, including the People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea, as well as their non-state proxies, are also increasingly resorting to similar hybrid tactics, including disinformation, cyberattacks, and election interference, to manipulate public debate and erode democratic institutions in Allied nations;
5. **Stressing** that authoritarian regimes also target democratic countries outside the Alliance with foreign interference operations aimed at imposing their repressive models of governance, disseminating their malevolent narratives and eroding sovereignty, as exemplified by Russia's actions before and during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine;
6. **Concerned** by the way authoritarian regimes increasingly echo and reinforce one another's false narratives, and misuse emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, and social media platforms to amplify the scale, speed and impact of their interference efforts;
7. **Noting** that terrorist groups also exploit elements of hybrid warfare, notably disinformation and cyber means, to spread fear, radicalise, and destabilise societies;
8. **Reaffirming** that the response to foreign interference must uphold the openness, transparency and freedom of expression that define Allied democracies;
9. **Applauding** already existing initiatives by individual Allies and NATO to counter hybrid attacks, including foreign interference, such as the updated NATO Strategy for countering hybrid threats, and **underlining** the need to develop national and collective frameworks and initiatives to identify, expose, and respond to such efforts;
10. **Welcoming** the inclusion in the Defence Investment Plan adopted at The Hague Summit of a commitment by Allies to spend 1.5% of GDP on defence and security-related investments, including the strengthening of national and collective resilience;
11. **Recognising** the vital role of parliamentarians in upholding and promoting democratic resilience to foreign interference through legislation, oversight and public engagement;
12. **Emphasising** that addressing foreign interference is a whole-of-society endeavour, requiring strong and independent institutions, vibrant civil society, free and pluralistic media, digital literacy, and transparency in political and electoral systems;

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\* Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71<sup>st</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

13. ***Reaffirming*** the importance of NATO in supporting and coordinating resilience-building efforts against foreign interference, while ***recognising*** that these areas remain primarily national prerogatives;

14. ***Underscoring*** the need for increased cooperation with the European Union, as well as regular and appropriate exchange with like-minded partners and international institutions, to effectively deter, address and mitigate foreign interference attempts;

15. **URGES** Allied Governments and Parliaments and, where appropriate, NATO institutions:

- a. to treat foreign interference as a strategic threat to national and collective security and to democratic governance, and to bolster policies to detect, prevent and respond effectively;
- b. to allocate a portion of the 1.5% of GDP in defence and security-related investments agreed on at The Hague Summit to strengthening the resilience of their societies to foreign interference;
- c. to adopt whole-of-society approaches to countering foreign interference involving national security institutions, civil society, media, academia, and the private sector;
- d. to enhance early-warning and attribution capabilities, and impose meaningful sanctions and diplomatic consequences on perpetrators;
- e. to reinforce legal frameworks and allocate sufficient resources to counter foreign influence and disinformation and to strengthen electoral and institutional defences, particularly to cyberattacks;
- f. to foster partnerships with technology providers, academia, fact-checkers and civil society to make information and environments more resilient, and to promote public education in digital and media literacy, as well as civic awareness;
- g. to regulate established and emerging technologies, particularly social media platforms and artificial intelligence, to prevent their misuse in hostile information operations, while adequately protecting freedom of speech and promoting transparency and accountability;
- h. to strengthen transparency frameworks regarding foreign funding of political parties, media outlets, academic institutions and civil society, to reduce the risk of covert influence;
- i. to consider integrating democratic resilience into NATO's baseline requirements for national resilience, at the collective level, and including core democratic institutions and processes among critical infrastructure, at the national level;
- j. to deepen cooperation with the European Union, and to exchange on a case-by-case basis with like-minded countries and international organisations facing similar foreign interference risks; and continue to support Ukraine in building its cyber defence and counter-disinformation capabilities as well as broader democratic resilience;
- k. to establish a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO HQ to share best practices and support Allies and partners in countering foreign interference;
- l. to promote comprehensive and sustained media and digital literacy programmes, including through formal education and lifelong learning, in order to equip citizens of all ages with the skills to recognise and resist manipulation and disinformation.

# MEETING THE MOMENT: NATO'S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IMPERATIVES AFTER THE HAGUE SUMMIT

## RESOLUTION 499\*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that Russia is the most significant and direct threat to Allied security demanding an immediate and strong response;
2. **Aware** that Russia's recent airspace incursions of Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, the most consequential violations of NATO airspace in its history, are in line with Russia's escalating and reckless brinkmanship against Allies' territory, populations, infrastructure, and interests, which includes sabotage, targeted assassinations, signals jamming, disinformation campaigns, and dangerous nuclear rhetoric, among other nefarious actions designed to undermine Allied unity and weaken support for Ukraine;
3. **Recognising** that all Allies, particularly those along the Eastern Flank, are exposed to near constant Russian threats and probing, that could be classified as state terrorism, and that Russia's aggressive policies, hostile to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, will not stop even in the event of a ceasefire or eventual structured peace agreement in Ukraine;
4. **Welcoming** the European Union and national commitments to build a drone wall along the Eastern Flank;
5. **Welcoming** Allies' swift decision to launch operation *Eastern Sentry*, a multi-domain effort to further enhance Allied defences along the Eastern Flank to shield and protect Allied territory and populations against any further incursion attempts;
6. **Remaining clear eyed** that Russia's unprovoked, brutal, and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine is the principal driver of the sea change in the Euro-Atlantic security environment that has upended longstanding principles and norms and constitutes a direct challenge to the post-WWII rules-based international order underwritten and defended by NATO Allies and their partners;
7. **Condemning** in the strongest possible terms Russia's systematic and deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine via daily missile and drone strikes – including on hospitals, schools, power plants, and grain export facilities – in flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law;
8. **Knowing** that a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, based on its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity is indispensable for the security of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area, and that any unjust settlement would deeply damage the principles of sovereignty and rule of law underpinning global stability and security;
9. **Understanding** that NATO Allies' continued high levels of military, financial, and political support to Ukraine remain vital for its legitimate self-defence efforts, and a core security imperative for Allies; and **applauding** the over USD 170 billion in military aid already delivered;
10. **Deeply concerned** by Russia's suspension of its participation in New START, and its continued selective implementation, or total disregard, of its arms control obligations; and

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\* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71<sup>st</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

**fully aware** that the erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks and norms further destabilises the global strategic environment;

11. **Deeply troubled** by the growing role of China as a strategic enabler of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine through the supply of dual-use technologies, microelectronics, and satellite imagery, alongside its growing imports from Russia that significantly undermine the impact and effectiveness of international sanctions;

12. **Strongly condemning** North Korea's large-scale transfer of artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and other munitions to Russia in blatant violation of UN Security Council resolutions, as well as the deployment of North Korean military personnel to support Russian operations, materially extending Moscow's capacity to continue its war of aggression on Ukraine;

13. **Also strongly condemning** Iran's supply of thousands of Shahed-136 attack drones, short-range ballistic missiles, and military advisers to aid Russia's war effort, which have had an outsized role on Russia's indiscriminate attacks on civilians and vital-to-life infrastructure;

14. **Understanding clearly** the deepening strategic alignment between Russia, China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea, whose growing convergence presents a systemic, coordinated, and pernicious challenge to Allied security, interests, and values;

15. **Noting further** that China and North Korea's enablement of and material support to Russia's war on Ukraine is the clearest manifestation to date of the increasing interlinkages of Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific security;

16. **Underlining** that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains the most direct asymmetric threat to Allied populations and international peace and prosperity;

17. **Acknowledging** Allies' substantial and sustained efforts since 2014 to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence posture, including enhanced forward presence, rotational deployments, and improved rapid reinforcement readiness;

18. **Recalling** the ambitious and historic decisions taken at the 2022 Madrid and 2023 Vilnius Summits, including the adoption of the New Force Model, the scaling up of battlegroups to the brigade level, and significant enhancements in force structure, which mark another fundamental shift in NATO's deterrence and defence posture;

19. **Highlighting** the importance of NATO's forward presence along the Eastern Flank and **commending** the progress achieved in scaling up presence and capabilities, while **underlining** the Alliance's 360-degree approach to security and the interlinkage of threats across the Eastern and Southern Flanks, where a range of threats recall the need for continued reinforcement;

20. **Underscoring** that nuclear deterrence remains at the core of NATO's collective defence, and that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance and Allies will continue to take all steps necessary to ensure NATO's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective;

21. **Welcoming** the significant increases in Allied defence spending over the last two years, including an additional USD 187 billion by NATO Europe and Canada, which represent a meaningful step forward to guaranteeing NATO's future security, and **applauding** Allied heads of state and government for taking the necessary and bold steps at The Hague Summit to agree to push for the most ambitious defence spending and investment requirements in a generation;

22. **Appreciating** the adoption of the 2024 NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and the updated 2025 Defence Production Action Plan resulting in already significantly expanded defence industrial production across the Alliance, steps to eliminate defence trade barriers among Allies, and

lower barriers to joint production, and paving the way for a new dynamism in transatlantic and cross-partner defence industrial cooperation;

23. **Acknowledging** the potential of innovation initiatives such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund to push new avenues for defence innovation and to sustain Allies' technological edge;

24. **Supporting** deeper and fully complimentary NATO-EU cooperation fostering stronger defence industrial investment, cooperation and production in the EU and with EU partners; and **encouraged** by recent EU initiatives, including Security Action for Europe (SAFE), and the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 to accelerate rearmament, strengthen the European defence industrial base, and ensure transatlantic interoperability;

25. **Recognising** Allies' efforts to promote closer cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners through instruments such as the 2024 Agenda for Tackling Shared Security Challenges and new Individually Tailored Partnership Programmes, and via increased joint military exercising, expanded defence industrial cooperation, and the participation of the IP4 leaders at NATO summits and ministerials;

26. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to demonstrate an ironclad and enduring political will and strength of character to tackle the significant and complex threats and challenges of the current security environment, thereby underwriting Article 5 commitments as the cornerstone of the Alliance of today and for tomorrow;
- b. to meet the moment of a generation by raising defence investments to 5% of GDP, as agreed to at The Hague Summit, with at least 3.5% of GDP allocated to core defence requirements to meet NATO's Capability Targets, and to submit the annual plans needed to demonstrate a credible path to reach the established target;
- c. to allocate the further 1.5% of GDP to defence- and security-related investments to protect critical infrastructure, defend cyber networks, boost civil preparedness and resilience, jumpstart innovation, and strengthen defence industrial bases;
- d. to implement the legislative frameworks needed to send consistent demand signals to unlock new funding to sustain the new defence spending momentum, vital to the Alliance's transformational promise of a new baseline for deterrence and defence;
- e. to continue to work to eliminate inter-Allied defence trade barriers and lower barriers to inter-Allied and partner defence industrial cooperation and innovation;
- f. to channel new investments into immediate priorities such as air, missile, and drone defences, advanced armoured vehicles, all forms of ammunition, enabling capabilities, long-range precision strikes, uncrewed platforms, and warships and aircraft, and more according to NATO's defence planning requirements for today and tomorrow;
- g. to support the initiatives of the European Union and individual Allies to build a drone wall, in close cooperation with NATO and drawing on Ukrainian practical expertise;
- h. to understand that Allies must commit to at least a five-fold increase in air and missile defence systems to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single points of failure across the Alliance's Eastern Flank, and to ensure these systems are interoperable and integrated within a wider integrated air and missile defence architecture that is tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions from state and non-state actors;

- i. to accelerate the implementation of the New Force Model and complete the scale-up of the battlegroups into brigades along the Eastern Flank, and to reinforce operation *Eastern Sentry*, providing them with additional capabilities such as air defence, heavy armour and forward positioned artillery and other strike capabilities to further strengthen Allied deterrence posture against increased Russian probing;
- j. to agree on a revision of NATO's rules of engagement, notably to combat the threat of drones;
- k. to continue to increase the quality and quantity of Allied joint-force exercising to further hone interoperability and readiness;
- l. to sustain and expand support for Ukraine to ensure it can defend as well as liberate territory, and achieve just and durable peace, including via new pledges of vital military and financial assistance, particularly the delivery of the additional USD 35 billion of outstanding pledged security assistance, additional contributions to the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List, and increased investment in Ukraine's domestic defence industry;
- m. to strengthen recruitment and retention efforts across the Alliance's armed forces to sustain NATO's enhanced collective defence posture, drawing on best practices from Allies with effective personnel models;
- n. to pursue frank and constructive consultations already underway between European Allies, the United States, and Canada on global force-posture priorities and equitable burden sharing;
- o. to support a more strategic and results-oriented approach towards the Mediterranean and the Southern Neighbourhood, as well as NATO's High North and Arctic;
- p. to broaden cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners through expanded joint exercises, industrial initiatives, and increased Allied presence in the region to secure common security interests and counter coercive practices targeting Allied and partner interests;
- q. to address systemic challenges posed by Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, including through robust cyber and societal resilience efforts by engaging Allied populations in a whole-of-nation defence concept.

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# STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AND SECURITY AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT IN THE HAGUE

## RESOLUTION 500\*

The Assembly,

1. **Stressing** that economic cooperation remains an essential element of the transatlantic partnership and **reaffirming** the importance of economic collaboration among NATO members in line with Article 2 of the NATO Treaty;
2. **Observing** that NATO Allies must coordinate military and economic strength to create a powerful deterrent against any threats to the peace, independence and stability of NATO members;
3. **Understanding** that robust economic security instruments can play a key role in complementing military and political means of achieving traditional Allied security objectives;
4. **Concerned** that strategic competition among the world's largest economies, challenges to the resilience of vital supply chains and a growing risk of technology theft move the world economy into a phase of geo-economic fragmentation;
5. **Cognisant** that Allies face challenges in striking the right balance between achieving security and remaining economically open;
6. **Stressing** that overexposure to overly concentrated international supply chains for strategic commodities needed in the defence industrial, energy, digital, food and other sectors critical to national security can leave Allies' militaries and economies vulnerable to enemies and competitors;
7. **Reiterating** its firm condemnation of Russia's unprovoked, full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine which poses a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;
8. **Recognising** that Russia's war against Ukraine as well as Russia's hybrid campaigns in Europe and assertiveness in the Global South has had a profound impact on the global economy, energy and food security as well as migration;
9. **Concerned** that China uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence as well as seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure and strategic materials, including critical raw materials and supply chains;
10. **Recognising** that China's toolbox for economic coercion has become more sophisticated, targeted and institutionalised;
11. **Convinced** that to effectively prepare for the new threats and challenges posed by Russia and China, NATO Allies should work to build a renewed sense of political and economic cohesion, recognising that economic issues have important bearing on Allied security;
12. **Endorsing** Allies' decision at the NATO Summit in The Hague, committing to invest 5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence- and security-related spending by 2035 to ensure Allies' individual and collective obligations, in accordance with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty, as well as The Hague Summit decision to work to eliminate defence trade barriers among Allies and leverage our partnerships to promote defence industrial cooperation;

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\* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71<sup>st</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

13. **Welcoming** NATO's increased focus on resilience, including resilient energy supplies as well as food and water resources, and **supporting** the decision to spend up to 1.5% of GDP annually on *inter alia* protecting critical infrastructure, ensuring Allied civil preparedness and resilience, unleashing innovation, and strengthening the Allied defence industrial base which will strengthen economic security;

14. **Welcoming** the Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade between the European Union and the United States, and the Priority Ukraine Requirements List (PURLL) mechanism established to bolster Ukrainian defence, **noting** the European Union's plans to substantially increase procurement of military and defence equipment from the United States, with the support and facilitation of the US government, and **acknowledging** that both parties commit to cooperate on ensuring secure, reliable, and diversified energy supplies, including by addressing non-tariff barriers that might restrict bilateral energy trade, while constituting a structured defence and technology industrial base capable of responding to the Russian threat;

15. **Welcoming** the Economic Prosperity Deal between the United Kingdom and the United States and **noting** that it aims at strengthening among others aerospace and aircraft manufacturing supply chains;

16. **Acknowledging** efforts to decrease dependence on Russian energy and **noting** the recent European Union legislation to completely phase out Europe's dependency on imported Russian natural gas and oil by 2028, while prioritising imports from our allies and fully respecting the specific geographical dependencies and structural constraints of individual member states, and ensuring that no Allied nation's energy security is compromised in the process;

17. **Acknowledging** that the future of the digital economy, sustainable energy industries and the defence sector depend on access to a range of critical raw materials;

18. **Endorsing** Allied actions to reduce their dependence on China for the supply of critical raw materials and **supporting** NATO's Defence-Critical Supply Chain Security Roadmap;

19. **Recognising** the importance of prioritising and strengthening economic security partnerships, including with Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union, Ukraine, Georgia, Global South countries and the private sector as well as **acknowledging** that deep public-private collaboration is essential and governments should treat private sector businesses as full partners in shaping and implementing economic security policies;

20. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to avoid economic policies that undermine the rules-based multilateral trade and investment system, recognising that trade wars among friends and Allies could empower states that do not share the Alliance's values;
- b. to ensure that the defence spending increase agreed at The Hague Summit solidifies the transatlantic economic partnership and the partnerships between Alliance members, ensures economic growth in Alliance nations, and helps lay the foundation for the technological strengths of their economies;
- c. to recognise economic power as an important pillar of deterrence and a cornerstone of Allied strategy to enhance transatlantic security more effectively;
- d. to revitalise NATO's approach to economic security by reintroducing regular high-level meetings and consultations focused on economic matters;
- e. to reestablish the NATO Economic Security Committee to handle economic security issues through monitoring global economic trends, assessing potential security threats, and coordinating economic security strategies among Allies;

- f. to include economic resilience as a critical part of the update of the seven NATO baseline requirements for resilience planned for 2026;
- g. to strengthen NATO cooperation with the European Union on the economic security agenda, including defence industry, innovation and technology, resilience, civil preparedness and critical infrastructure protection, while ensuring inclusion of non-EU Allies in the EU's respective efforts in these fields;
- h. to foster a more institutionalised NATO-OECD policy alignment, including by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's active participation in the OECD Global Parliamentary Network, to discuss economic security issues, such as standards;
- i. to create a NATO Partnership for Essential Raw Materials to build a common understanding among Allies on strategic raw materials and align their economic policies to secure reliable access to them and enhance supply chain resilience;
- j. to develop a coherent strategy to counter geo-economic fragmentation in relations between Allies and countries in the Global South to stimulate economic growth and reduce pressure of economic migration;
- k. to reinforce and make full use of export control mechanisms by ensuring that incentives are in place for commercial operators to comply with the rules, including criminal statutes aimed at those violating these export controls;
- l. to deepen enforcement cooperation and work to harmonise existing and future sanctions and trade measures on Russia to facilitate enforcement and make circumvention far more difficult;
- m. to rapidly expand transatlantic defence industrial cooperation and work to eliminate defence trade barriers;
- n. to mobilise private capital engagement in the defence sector and stimulate regionally dispersed investment to rebuild Allied industrial capacity that should lead to building cross-national technological and industrial Allied ecosystems;
- o. to recognise that economic security requires a cultural shift and both private and public sectors must adapt long-standing assumptions, practices and operating procedures to reflect today's more contested security environment;
- p. to encourage the private sector to move from an opportunity-first mindset to one that prioritises geopolitical risk awareness, resilience planning and investment in security;
- q. to leverage the economic security agenda to synchronise military and non-military instruments of power in order to better integrate private-sector capabilities across domains, expand industrial base capacity and protect critical infrastructure from kinetic and non-kinetic attacks;
- r. to prioritise moving food to international markets in an unhindered manner, even in a time of geo-economic fragmentation and recognise the strategic value of food production and food commodities;
- s. continue to work on food security in NATO in the framework of the Food and Agriculture Planning Group and maintain close cooperation with Ukraine in this regard to ensure the resilience of food systems across the Alliance, and future-proofing them against disruption and shocks.

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# FOSTERING STABILITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

## RESOLUTION 501\*

The Assembly,

1. **Reaffirming** NATO's long-standing engagement in the Western Balkans as essential to safeguarding peace, security, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and **underscoring** the region's strategic importance to the Alliance;
2. **Commemorating** the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the Bosnian War and preserved Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a single state, and **recalling** the Spring Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly hosted by the City of Dayton, Ohio, from 23-26 May 2025, attended by Heads of State and Government from across the Western Balkans as well as key leaders who were instrumental in the negotiations of the Dayton Peace Accords;
3. **Commemorating** the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, honouring the memory of the victims, and reaffirming the significance of justice, reconciliation, and the prevention of future atrocities in BiH and the wider region;
4. **Recognising** the remarkable transformation of Southeastern Europe over the past 30 years and the valuable contributions of NATO Allies Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Slovenia to NATO operations and to the collective security of the Alliance, and **welcoming** their continued efforts to promote regional stability;
5. **Expressing deep concern** about the political and constitutional crisis in BiH, particularly the secessionist rhetoric and actions of the *Republika Srpska*'s leadership and repeated violations of the Dayton Peace Accords, **reiterating** that the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and long-term stability must not be questioned or undermined while **commending** the strong and united stance of Allied leaders in unequivocally condemning this dangerous and destabilising behaviour;
6. **Welcoming** the continued presence of EUFOR Operation Althea and KFOR as stabilising anchors in the region, and **reaffirming** the importance of coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU in the region;
7. **Expressing concern** about the lack of progress and **encouraging** further efforts to revitalise the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue as the principal avenue to normalise relations, ensure the rights of all communities, and advance both parties' European aspirations;
8. **Expressing concern** over increasing external interference, especially from the Russian Federation, which seeks to exploit unresolved political disputes, fuel polarisation, and undermine democratic institutions and public trust in the Western Balkans;
9. **Recalling** NATO's commitment to the Open Door Policy and **supporting** the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of BiH;
10. **Emphasising** the need to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law, and media freedom across the Western Balkans in order to ensure sustainable peace in the region;

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\* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71<sup>st</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

11. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to reaffirm NATO's enduring commitment to peace and stability in the Western Balkans, to support the region's democratic consolidation, and to accelerate its European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration processes;
- b. to continue signalling that the Alliance will not allow a security vacuum to return to the region and will take action, if necessary, to safeguard peace;
- c. to strengthen NATO's engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including through support for NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, political engagement, the Defence Capacity Building Package, and other mechanisms of practical cooperation, in close coordination with the EU and its EUFOR Operation Althea;
- d. to reaffirm NATO's Open Door Policy and support BiH's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including assistance in implementing its Reform Programme with NATO and fostering inclusive political dialogue;
- e. to condemn inflammatory secessionist rhetoric and actions by RS leadership in BiH, while supporting efforts to de-escalate tensions, foster reconciliation and, if necessary, to reform BiH institutions through the constitutional process with the consent of the country's three constituent peoples;
- f. to ensure continued support for KFOR's presence and mandate in Kosovo as a guarantor of stability and deterrent against renewed violence, and to expand support for confidence-building measures between communities;
- g. to support the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and encourage both parties to refrain from unilateral steps that risk escalating tensions and to seek full and sustainable implementation of their commitments under the 2013 Brussels Agreement and the 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation (Ohrid Agreement);
- h. to maintain their engagement with Serbia, respecting Serbia's sovereign choices, while upholding the values and security interests of the Alliance;
- i. to further increase NATO-EU complementarity in the Western Balkans, including joint planning, intelligence-sharing, and coordinated capacity-building for regional partners;
- j. to increase efforts to counter malign foreign influence and hybrid threats in the region, including through enhanced strategic communications, media literacy, infrastructure security, and resilience-building;
- k. to deepen cooperation with civil society actors, local institutions, and independent media across the region to strengthen democratic resilience, media pluralism, and rule-of-law frameworks in the face of authoritarian influence;
- l. to ensure NATO remains visibly and substantively engaged in the Western Balkans through high-level visits, public diplomacy, parliamentary outreach, and regular consultations with regional leaders to foster stability, trust, and shared security.

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# SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE AND THE IMPERATIVE OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE

## RESOLUTION 502\*

The Assembly,

1. **Pledging** to stand firmly with Ukraine until and beyond the achievement of a just and lasting peace;
2. **Condemning in the strongest terms** Russia's ongoing aggression and intensifying attacks against Ukraine, including missile, drone and artillery attacks against civilians and critical infrastructure;
3. **Denouncing** Russia's reckless and escalatory violations of the airspace of Allied nations in connection with its aggression against Ukraine, **expressing** its full solidarity with the Allies concerned, and **welcoming** NATO's decision to execute Eastern Sentry along NATO's Eastern flank;
4. **Deeply concerned** about the Russian shadow fleet and its negative impact on security, the environment and the economy;
5. **Welcoming** Allies' decisions at recent NATO Summits to strengthen deterrence and defence, institutionalise long-term support to Ukraine, and include direct military support to Ukraine in national defence and defence-related spending targets;
6. **Backing** the diplomatic initiatives of the United States, including through the Istanbul negotiation process, to bring the war to an end while preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and deterring future aggression, **commending** the close coordination between the Allies and Ukraine, based on the principle that nothing about Ukraine should be decided without Ukraine, and **emphasising** the role of European Allies in all discussions on the path towards peace;
7. **Emphasising** the importance and urgency of an immediate, comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire;
8. **Stressing** that meaningful and enforceable security guarantees are essential to deter renewed aggression;
9. **Recognising** the strategic importance of working towards fairer burden sharing among all Allies across all types of assistance to Ukraine, and **welcoming** the commitment of the Coalition of the Willing to provide robust security guarantees to Ukraine and, if requested by Ukraine, a multinational reassurance force, while **underscoring** the indispensable role of the United States' support in these efforts;
10. **Deploring** the consistent refusal of the Russian Federation to accept a ceasefire and its determination to persist in its war of aggression;
11. **Saluting** the political and practical support that NATO and individual Allies continue to provide to Ukraine, particularly through the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), the NATO Representation in Ukraine (NRU), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), NATO Prioritised Ukraine

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\* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71<sup>st</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

Requirements List (PURL) initiative and other instruments to support Ukraine's ability to defend itself, its resilience and its Euro-Atlantic integration;

12. **Condemning** the Russian Federation's systematic use of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, medical neglect and starvation against Ukrainian prisoners of war, in violation of international humanitarian law, and **demanding** immediate and unconditional access for international monitoring missions, including the International Committee of the Red Cross and UN mechanisms, to all places of detention;
13. **Stressing** that a just and durable peace requires full accountability for the crime of aggression, war crimes, and other grave violations of international law, the full exchange of prisoners of war, and the safe return of all abducted and unlawfully transferred Ukrainian civilians, especially children;
14. **Recalling** the disproportionate impact of the war on women, and **underscoring** the importance of mainstreaming the Women, Peace and Security and Human Security agendas in all assistance and peace support efforts;
15. **Highlighting** the importance of continuing to mobilise international support for Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, reform and modernisation, and **welcoming** the progress achieved in the recent fourth Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome in July 2025, as well as the previous conferences held in Lugano (2022), London (2023), and Berlin (2024);
16. **Supporting** the important work of the Crimea Platform;
17. **Emphasising** the imperative of nuclear safety and security, including the restoration of full Ukrainian control over the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and uninterrupted IAEA access;
18. **Denouncing** the assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean regimes to Russia's war of aggression;
19. **Acknowledging** the vital role of Allied parliaments in sustaining public support and funding for assistance to Ukraine and for any future peace-support arrangements;
20. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to implement fully and promptly the decisions of the NATO Summit in The Hague on defence spending in order to strengthen NATO's collective defence, as well as to support Ukraine's defence needs as Ukraine's security contributes to Allies' own security;
  - b. to ensure the timely and continuous delivery of critical capabilities to Ukraine, including layered air and missile defence, long-range precision strike, artillery systems and ammunition, multi-role fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, counter-UAS and electronic warfare systems, maritime and air domain awareness tools, leveraging NATO coordination mechanisms, including PURL, and Allied facilities;
  - c. to ensure that Ukraine, in its international right to defend itself, can use weapons provided by NATO Allies to strike legitimate targets in Russia;
  - d. to coordinate closely – among themselves and with Ukraine – diplomatic initiatives to end the war;
  - e. to reaffirm that Russia's attempts to occupy and annex internationally recognised Ukrainian territory will never be recognised;
  - f. to deliver, in consultation with Ukraine and interested partners, on the commitments to establish a multinational reassurance force with a robust mandate to deter and respond to ceasefire violations, including over-the-horizon support and rapid-reinforcement mechanisms, as well as clear command and force protection arrangements;

- g. to reaffirm that Ukraine's path to NATO membership is irreversible, and that Ukraine's future NATO membership is a sovereign decision of Ukraine and NATO Allies alone, based solely on the will of the Ukrainian people and authorities and the fulfilment of membership criteria;
- h. to consider the strongest bilateral or multi-lateral mutual defence guarantees to Ukraine, to deter future aggression;
- i. to commit to assisting Ukraine in sustaining robust, well-trained and well-equipped armed forces over the long term, including after the war, to serve as Ukraine's first line of defence against future aggression;
- j. to expand, tighten, and fully enforce sanctions and export controls on Russia and its enablers, including through secondary measures and by closing evasion channels, to raise the cost of continued aggression;
- k. to support international accountability efforts, including the work of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine within the framework of the Council of Europe;
- l. to require the full release and exchange of prisoners of war, the safe return of abducted civilians, particularly children, and to mandate diplomatic missions to assist tracing and family reunification efforts;
- m. to accelerate defence-industrial expansion, including co-production with Ukraine's defence sector, secure supply chains, and integration with NATO and EU initiatives;
- n. to support Ukraine's governance and reform agenda, including anti-corruption institutions and transparent defence procurement, as key enablers for sustained assistance and Euro-Atlantic integration;
- o. to assist Ukraine in reinforcing civilian and energy resilience, including critical infrastructure protection, cyber defence, and strategic communications;
- p. to support Ukraine's reconstruction through sustained public and private financing, including the use of frozen Russian assets and windfall proceeds, and to develop investment frameworks to attract private capital;
- q. to continue deepening EU-NATO cooperation on Ukraine, while ensuring full inclusion of non-EU Allies and coordination with like-minded partners around the world;
- r. to continue contributing to Black Sea security, safety of navigation in line with the Vilnius and Washington Summit decisions, Ukraine's maritime domain awareness and grain corridor protection.

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## PREPARING NATO FOR THE FUTURE OF UNCREWED WARFARE

### RESOLUTION 503\*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that uncrewed systems are transforming armed conflict, as demonstrated in recent conflicts, and that leadership in this field is crucial to maintaining NATO's technological edge;
2. **Acknowledging** the potential military benefits that integration of uncrewed systems offers in the air, on the ground and at sea;
3. **Stressing** that uncrewed systems complement, rather than replace, crewed systems, and **underlining** that uncrewed systems necessitate near-constant innovation and adaptation;
4. **Highlighting** that attacks by drones can represent a form of financial and industrial denial-of-service attack aiming to overwhelm traditional air defence systems, and that defending against uncrewed systems poses unique challenges, creating a clear cost asymmetry between attack drones and interceptors;
5. **Observing** that uncrewed systems, and their associated pace of innovation and rapid deployment demand, present opportunities and challenges for armed forces, warranting caution that international law and ethical and legally binding rules of engagement not be overlooked to meet demands of rapid deployment;
6. **Applauding** Ukraine for its development, production, and use of uncrewed systems in its fight against Russia's illegal invasion and its pioneering in innovative procurement and production cycles through the introduction of an online marketplace for military technology, thereby empowering soldiers to order what they need when they need it and pushing procurement command and control down to the tactical level; while also **emphasising** the clear threat posed by Russian uncrewed systems to NATO airspace and sovereignty;
7. **Strongly supporting** NATO's efforts to foster an innovative ecosystem and forward-looking approach to uncrewed systems and warfare through the NATO Innovation Fund, its investments in promising start-ups working on uncrewed aerial systems and uncrewed surface vessels, and the NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic's (DIANA) 2026 focus on autonomy and unmanned systems;
8. **Encouraging** the Alliance to do more joint exercises focusing on uncrewed systems, like NATO's Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Technical Interoperability Exercise;
9. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to advance joint efforts on uncrewed systems to ensure that NATO maintains its technological edge and that its armed forces can leverage the technology's benefits while being cognisant of the operational, ethical, and legal challenges, including civilian oversight, of uncrewed systems;
  - b. to continue advancing and streamlining the Alliance's conceptual thinking on uncrewed systems, and to continuously assess and ensure their interoperability to deconflict their utilisation in a shared warfighting space, while also ensuring that these systems are compatible with civilian airspace use during peacetime;

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\* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 71st Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on Monday 13 October 2025.

- c. to develop and enforce joint operational and tactical standards on the integration of uncrewed systems to legacy systems to strengthen collective defence, and to address future interoperability challenges by incorporating uncrewed systems in all Allied exercises;
- d. to continue ensuring and enhancing the Alliance's ability to adapt to volatile environments by putting in place structures that prepare the Alliance for the rapid cycles of measures, counter-measures and counter-counter-measures, and innovation, development and production, while allowing soldiers on the ground to directly engage with developers and producers of uncrewed systems and a rapid ramp up in production of new and adapted systems, including through forward-deployed 3D printers that facilitate production of required materials close to the tactical level;
- e. to actively continue delivering on the goal of eliminating defence trade barriers among Allies and leveraging partnerships with actors like Ukraine to promote further defence industrial cooperation, as reaffirmed by the Summit Declaration issued in The Hague;
- f. to work towards a proactive and coherent strategic framework and activities across NATO bodies and member countries, enabling governance to keep pace with technical developments and innovation and ensuring that ethical and legal guidelines are effectively implemented on the ground;
- g. to ensure that the development and acquisition of uncrewed systems at the national level is coherent with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP);
- h. to further advance the inclusion and streamlining of uncrewed systems in all aspects of defence planning while ensuring their complementarity with crewed systems, making sure that Allies consider uncrewed systems as fully part of multi-domain operations, and not as an either/or, to ensure that their potential is fully leveraged to prepare the Alliance for the future of uncrewed warfare.

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