Commission accepts commitments by Corning to ensure competition in the supply of cover glass for handheld electronic devices

The European Commission has made commitments offered by Corning legally binding under EU antitrust rules. The commitments address the Commission's competition concerns over Corning's conclusion of allegedly anticompetitive exclusive agreements for the supply of Alkali-aluminosilicate glass (‘Alkali-AS Glass'), a special type of glass mainly used as cover glass in smartphones and other handheld electronic devices.

The Commission's preliminary concerns

Corning is a US-based global producer of glass for many industrial and consumer applications. It manufactures Alkali-AS Glass, a particularly break-resistant glass mainly used as cover for displays of handheld electronic devices such as mobile phones, tablets, but also smartwatches. Corning markets Alkali-AS Glass mainly under the ‘Gorilla Glass' brand. Alkali-AS Glass has two commercially relevant subtypes, lithium aluminosilicate glass (‘LAS Glass') and sodium aluminosilicate glass (‘NAS Glass').

On 6 November 2024, the Commission opened a formal investigation over concerns that Corning may have distorted competition in the worldwide market for Alkali-AS Glass. The Commission preliminarily found that Corning holds a dominant position on this market. It also found that products developed by Corning for Apple are not part of this market, as these have special compositions and are only used by Apple.

According to the Commission's preliminary assessment, Corning may have abused its dominant position in the market for Alkali-AS Glass in breach of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU') by concluding exclusive supply agreements with manufacturers (Original Equipment Manufacturers or ‘OEMs') of handheld electronic devices and with companies that process raw glass (‘finishers') such as Alkali-AS Glass. This conduct may have excluded other Alkali-AS Glass producers from large segments of the relevant market.

The commitments

To address the Commission's preliminary concerns Corning offered certain commitments. Between 25 November 2024 and 13 January 2025, the Commission market tested those commitments and consulted interested third parties to verify whether the commitments would remove its competition concerns.

In light of the outcome of this market test, Corning amended the initially proposed commitments and offered the following final commitments: 

• To include in the scope of the commitments both Alkali-AS Glass and transparent glass ceramics (‘Clear Glass Ceramics') used as cover glass in handheld electronic devices. Clear Glass Ceramics were included in the commitments because this cover material is likely to be used more extensively in the future by OEMs. But the commitments would not apply to Corning's agreements with Apple given that the Commission found that the cover glass products developed by Corning for Apple are not part of the relevant market.
• To waive all exclusive dealing clauses in all its current agreements with OEMs and finishers, and to commit not to use such or similar clauses that have the same effect in future agreements.
• In the European Economic Area (EEA): When it comes to OEMs' demand for Alkali-AS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics covers for handheld electronic devices sold in the EEA, not to specifically require OEMs to purchase, or cause their supply chain to purchase, any quantity of Alkali-AS Glass or Clear Glass Ceramics from Corning and will not condition any price advantages on such sourcing requirements.
• Worldwide: Not to require OEMs to purchase, or cause their supply chain to purchase, more than 50% of their respective demand from Corning, as regards either (I) OEMs' worldwide combined demand for Alkali-AS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics covers for handheld electronic devices, and (ii) OEM's worldwide demand for either of the segments of LAS Glass or Clear Glass Ceramics covers of handheld electronic devices. Without these separate caps, Corning could target the competitively sensitive LAS Glass and Clear Glass Ceramics segments with exclusive sourcing requirements, while still complying with the overall cap. In addition, Corning will not condition price advantages on such sourcing requirements.
• Not to require finishers to purchase from Corning more than 50% of their combined worldwide demand for Alkali-AS Glass (NAS Glass, LAS Glass), and Clear Glass Ceramics covers for handheld electronic devices, nor to condition price advantages on such purchasing requirements. In addition, Corning will not use any purchasing requirements targeting any segment (i.e. NAS Glass, LAS Glass or Clear Glass Ceramics) of this combined worldwide demand, nor condition price advantages on such purchasing requirements. This means that finishers are free to decide on how they comply with the overall cap in terms of the type and quantity of the different cover materials.
• When it comes to the enforcement (in court or via arbitration) of Corning's patents related to break-resistant cover glass that are within the scope of the commitments, to base its claims only on patent infringement, and not on breach of contract. In addition, Corning will not use any other contractual mechanisms (e.g. penalties) to reinforce its patent claims.
• To include a standard anti-circumvention clause, the interpretation of which is further clarified in an interpretative note annexed to the commitments.                                   
• To deliver a market communication to key stakeholders (OEMs and finishers) explaining the content of these commitments, in English and Chinese Mandarin.

The Commission concluded that the above final commitments would address its competition concerns over Corning's conduct identified in its preliminary assessment. It therefore decided to make them legally binding on Corning.

The commitments will remain in force for nine years and apply worldwide. A monitoring trustee speaking Chinese Mandarin will ensure their implementation.

Background

Article 102 of the TFEU, which can also be applied by the national competition authorities, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade within the EU and prevent or restrict competition. The implementation of this provision is defined in Regulation No 1/2003.

Article 9(1) of Regulation 1/2003 enables companies investigated by the Commission to offer commitments in order to meet the Commission's concerns and empowers the Commission to adopt a decision to make such commitments binding on the companies. Such a decision does not reach a conclusion as to whether there is an infringement of EU antitrust rules but legally binds its addressee to respect the commitments.

Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003 requires that before adopting such decision the Commission shall provide interested third parties with the opportunity to comment on the offered commitments.

If the company concerned does not honour these commitments, the Commission may impose a fine of up to 10% of its total annual turnover, without having to find an infringement of EU antitrust rules, or a periodic penalty payment of 5% per day of its daily turnover for every day of non-compliance.

More information, including the full text of the commitments, will be available on the Commission's competition website, in the public case register under the case number AT.40728.