Commission fines fashion brands Gucci, Chloé and Loewe over €157 million for anticompetitive pricing practices

The European Commission has fined fashion companies Gucci, Chloé and Loewe for fixing resale prices, in breach of EU competition rules. The Commission's investigation revealed that the three companies restricted the ability of the independent third-party retailers they work with to set their own online and offline retail prices for products designed and sold by Gucci, Chloé and Loewe under their respective brand names. This kind of anticompetitive behaviour increases prices and reduces choice for consumers.

The fines, which were reduced in all three cases due to the companies' cooperation with the Commission, amounted to over €157 million in total.

The infringement

Gucci, Chloé and Loewe are fashion companies headquartered in Italy, France and Spain respectively. They are all active in the design, production, and distribution of high-end fashion products, including apparel, leather goods and various accessories.

The Commission's investigation revealed that these three fashion companies engaged in a practice called resale price maintenance (‘RPM'). They restricted the ability of both their online and brick-and-mortar retailers, which are independent resellers, to set their own retail prices for almost the entire range of products designed and sold by Gucci, Chloé and Loewe under their respective brand names, including apparel, leather goods, shoes and fashion accessories. The infringements covered the whole territory of the European Economic Area (‘EEA').

In particular, the three fashion companies interfered with their retailers' commercial strategies by imposing restrictions on them, such as requiring them to not deviate from: (i) recommended retail prices; (ii) maximum discounts rates; and (iii) specific periods for sales. In certain cases, and at least temporarily, they also prohibited retailers from offering any discounts. Gucci, Chloé and Loewe strived to have their retailers apply the same prices and sales conditions they applied in their own direct sales channels.

To ensure compliance with their pricing policies, the three fashion companies monitored the retailers' prices and followed up with deviating retailers. The retailers in general adhered to the companies' pricing policies, either from the start or after being requested to do so.

These anticompetitive practices by Gucci, Chloé and Loewe deprived the retailers of their pricing independence and reduced competition between them. At the same time, Gucci, Chloé and Loewe aimed to protect their own sales from competition from their retailers.

In addition, Gucci imposed online sales restrictions for a specific product line by asking its retailers to stop selling the product online. Gucci's retailers complied with these instructions. 

The following table details the duration of each company's infringement:

The practices ended, for all three fashion companies, in April 2023, when the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at their premises.

Today's decisions conclude that the anti-competitive practices in each of the three cases constitute a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU') and of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, which prohibit agreements and other restrictive business practices that may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition within the Single Market.

The three fashion companies acted independently of each other. However, the duration of the three cases overlaps and many of the retailers concerned sell products designed by all three designers. The three decisions concern the high-end segment of the fashion industry and send a strong signal against RPM practices for sales online and in brick-and-mortar shops to the entire industry. This kind of anticompetitive behaviour increases prices and reduces choice for consumers.

Fines

The fines were set on the basis of the Commission's 2006 Guidelines on fines.

In setting the fines, the Commission considered various elements, including the gravity and duration of the infringements, their geographic scope, as well as the value of the direct and indirect sales of the products concerned generated by each of the three fashion companies in the EEA over the duration of the infringement.

In addition, the Commission took into account the fact that the three fashion companies cooperated with the Commission under the antitrust cooperation procedure. The individual reductions of the fine amounts reflect the timing and value of the cooperation in each individual case.

In particular, Gucci and Loewe cooperated with the Commission by providing evidence with significant added value at an early stage of the investigation. Gucci's cooperation included revealing an infringement of EU competition rules not yet known to the Commission, while Loewe's cooperation allowed the Commission to extend the temporal scope of that infringement.

All three fashion companies cooperated by expressly acknowledging the facts and their infringements of EU antitrust rules, which allowed the Commission to conclude the cases under the antitrust cooperation procedure.

The fine imposed on each company is as follows:

Background

The Commission started these investigations on its own motion and carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of Gucci (Italy), Chloé (France) and Loewe (Spain) in April 2023. The Commission opened formal proceedings in July 2024.

Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement prohibit agreements and other restrictive business practices that may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition within the Single Market. The implementation of Article 101 TFEU is defined in Regulation 1/2003.

The antitrust cooperation procedure is inspired by the well-established cartel settlements procedure and can be used in other situations where companies are willing to acknowledge their liability for an infringement of the EU competition rules (including the facts and legal qualification). The cooperation framework allows the Commission to apply a simpler and faster procedure and the cooperating companies to obtain a reduction in fines.  The Commission assesses on a case-by-case basis whether a case would be suitable for cooperation, taking into account the probability of reaching a common understanding with the company within a reasonable timeframe. There is neither a right nor an obligation for companies to pursue the cooperation path.

Fines imposed on companies found in breach of EU antitrust rules are paid into the general EU budget. These proceeds are not earmarked for particular expenses, but Member States' contributions to the EU budget for the following year are reduced accordingly. The fines therefore help to finance the EU and reduce the burden for taxpayers.

More information on these decisions will be available under the case numbers AT.40840 (Gucci), AT.40880 (Chloé) and AT.40881 (Loewe), in the public case register on the Commission's competition website, once confidentiality issues have been resolved.

Whistleblower tool

The Commission has set up a tool to make it easier for individuals or companies to alert it about anticompetitive behaviour while maintaining their anonymity. This tool protects whistleblowers' anonymity through a specifically-designed encrypted messaging system that allows two-way communications. The tool is accessible via this link.

Action for damages

Any person or company affected by anticompetitive behaviour as described in these cases may bring the matter before the courts of the Member States and seek damages. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Regulation 1/2003 both confirm that in cases before national courts, a Commission decision that has become final constitutes binding proof that the behaviour took place and was illegal. Even though the Commission has fined the companies, damages may be awarded by national courts without being reduced on account of the Commission fine.

The  Antitrust Damages Directive makes it easier for victims of anti-competitive practices to obtain damages. More information on antitrust damages actions, including a practical guide on how to quantify antitrust harm, is available here.