Questions and answers on the 21st package of sanctions against Russia

ENERGY MEASURES

What energy measures are included in the package?

Curbing Russia's energy export revenues is the most effective way to inflict significant costs on Russia and to weaken its ability to finance the war. At a time in which the Iran war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have impacted on global oil prices, creating an opportunity for Russia to benefit, the EU remains steadfast in its aim to maintain the intensity of the measures we have introduced and keep up the pressure even while others are partially weakening their sanctions.

Oil Price Cap: suspension of adaptation of the price cap until July 2027

The EU has decided to suspend the adaptation of the price cap agreed in the 18th sanctions package for a full year until July 2027. This will keep strong downward pressure on Russian crude exports to ensure that Russia does not benefit from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. There remains the possibility to review the price cap earlier in case of exceptional market developments.

Shadow fleet: 41 additional vessels have been listed

Today, the EU listed 41 additional vessels of the Russian Shadow Fleet. These vessels have been identified together with Member States and will now be subject to a port access ban and a ban on receiving services. Moreover, the EU is expanding the criteria for vessels listings to allow for the listing of any ship supplying or refuelling sanctioned ships or taking cargo from them (bunkering and ship-to-ship transfers). This should act as a further vessel-specific deterrent to tackle the logistics of the shadow fleet.

Critical infrastructure transaction ban

This package introduces more transaction bans on critical infrastructure — targeting ports, airports, and refineries that enable Russia's military and economic resilience. In particular:

  • Transaction bans on two Russian ports (Olya and Vysotsk);
  • Transaction bans on four airports (Sheremetyevo in Moscow, Ulyanovsk-Vostochny, Rostov-on-Don Platov Airport, Mineralnye Vody Airport, used for the transport of goods and technology in the defence and security sector).

Additionally, today the EU has expanded the ban to refineries that process Russian oil. By targeting these nodes directly and not just their respective owners, we aim to sever Russia's supply chains, limit its energy revenues, and closeloopholes in the sanctions regime. At the same time, the EU is proposing the specific listing of one third-country refinery, the Kulevi refinery in Georgia, for its reliance on Russian crude while continuing to export petroleum products to the EU. This listing will enter into force with a six-month delay to give the refinery time to diversify from its reliance on Russian crude oil. Following an assessment by the Commission, the Council will then decide whether it is still necessary to list the refinery.

LNG tankers sale

The sale of LNG tankers to third countries will be now subject to a notification obligation. Further, following a Commission assessment in three months, the Council will decide whether a full ban of sales to Russia should be implemented.  

LNG terminal services ban

The LNG terminal services ban was introduced in the 20th sanctions package. Today, we are refining its scope of application to clarify that it covers not only Russian and EU operators but also non-Russian third-country operators that are controlled by Russian companies.

Transfer of Russian LNG to third countries

A temporary exemption is introduced for the transfer of Russian LNG to third countries and purchases linked to those transfers to third countries for one year subject to renewal to ensure legal certainty and the orderly phasing out of activities. A review process guarantees that the historical volume of 2025 is not exceeded, thus preventing any increase in the export revenues Russia derives from such transfers.

Oil traders

The EU imposed a transaction ban on 5 additional oil traders for their role in sanctions frustration.

FINANCIAL MEASURES

What measures have you taken against Russian and third country banks and crypto platforms?

Today, the EU further strengthened the EU sanctions framework with new financial restrictions. The measures include sanctions on Russian banks, third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset entities, and a dedicated third country ban for crypto-asset services. In addition, these measures will act as a deterrent for those countries hosting crypto platforms that are used to evade sanctions. They close loopholes, enhance oversight, and maintain pressure on Russia's war economy. In particular:

  • Russian banking sector: New transaction bans on 33 additional Russian financial institutions. As a result, more than 100 Russian banks in total are now subject to these bans. This creates massive pressure on the Russian banking sector and further restricts its ability to support the financing of the war.
  • Third country banks frustrating sanctions or connected to Russian payment systems: A transaction ban is imposed on one bank in Mongolia, a Kyrgyz bank, and two Indian branches of Russian banks.
  • Crypto platforms: New transaction bans on fourteen crypto platforms and crypto-linked firms active in sanctions circumvention. These platforms or firms are located in Georgia, Panama, El Salvador, UAE, the Marshall Islands, and Belarus.
  • Third-country ban for crypto-asset services: Creating an instrument to ban any transaction between EU operators and any crypto-assets services or platforms in specific listed third countries that have systematically and persistently failed to prevent the frustration of EU sanctions through crypto. Even though no countries are currently listed under this ban, this article will act as a deterrent and prompt third countries to take action to prevent their jurisdiction from being used for circumvention via crypto.
  • Russian nationals on boards of crypto services companies: Extending the prohibition for Russian nationals to own, control, or serve on the boards of any company offering crypto services regulated under MiCA (e.g., exchanges, trading platforms).
  • Exception on transactions ban on Russia and third-country banks and crypto operators: Introducing a derogation on the transaction ban on newly listed Russian and third-country banks and crypto platforms to allow EU nationals to withdraw funds belonging to them. The aim is to deprive sanctioned banks and crypto platforms of an excuse to retain those funds to the detriment of EU citizens.

The 21st package also lifts the transaction ban on one bank in Azerbaijan, as the reasons for which it had originally been listed have been addressed.

TRADE MEASURES

EXPORTS

Which are the new export restrictions and bans included in the 21st package of sanctions?

Today's export restrictions on additional items and technologies further disrupt the battlefield effort and weaken Russia's military-industrial complex.

New export restrictions cover nickel powders, metal, and alloys, used in corrosion resistant coating of jet engines; Beryllium powder used in propellants; and self-adhesive films, tapes, and strips used in the aerospace and defence sectors.

The EU is eliminating inconsistencies in the existing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs/drones) controls, using as a reference the control text in the Iranian Missile and UAV Regime. These relate to ground support equipment for UAVs; jamming/interception systems for UAVs; launch systems for UAVs; flight termination systems for UAVs and missiles; and servomotors for UAVs.

IMPORTS

What are the new import bans included in the 21st package of sanctions?

Today, the EU introduces import bans for a number of goods (EU imports worth EUR 60 million in 2025, EUR 285 million pre-invasion, 2021):

  • copper ores, nickel ores, lead ores and precious-metals ores, locking-in diversification that was completed in 2025;
  • unwrought zinc alkali and alkaline-earth metals;
  • certain inorganic chemicals (zinc oxides and chromium oxides); tall oil;
  • glassware;
  • imitation pearls; and
  • car parts.

ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES

What measures are included to combat circumvention?

This package adds to the list in Annex IV 51 new entities, which are part of or support Russia's military-industrial complex or enable the circumvention of EU sanctions. This includes 24 entities established in Russia and 27 in third countries:14 in China (including 4 in Hong Kong), 4 in Türkiye, 3 in Kyrgyzstan, 2 in India, 2 in Kazakhstan, and 2 in the United Arab Emirates.  Tighter export restrictions apply to these entities.

LEGAL PROTECTION OF EU OPERATORS

What are the new provisions adopted that further protect EU operators?

The 21st package introduces additional legal protection for EU operators against abusive lawsuits from Russians in retaliation of EU sanctions.

  • First, the EU extends the possibility for EU firms to sue in the EU their non-Russian contractual parties if these non-Russian parties sue the EU firm outside the EU for having suspended or terminated their contracts to comply with sanctions.
  • Second, the 21st package gives EU Courts the authority to order ‘anti-enforcement injunctions'. These orders are meant to deter the enforcement in non-EU countries of unlawful judgments or orders issued by Russian courts.
  • Third, it requires Member States not to recognise or enforce decisions by Russian courts or authorities when those decisions are connected to sanctions.

LISTINGS

Who have you targeted?

The 21st package of EU sanctions adds 48 individuals and 170 entities to the list of natural and legal persons subject to asset freezes and the prohibition to make funds and economic resources available to them. The new listings chiefly aim to disrupt Russian energy and other revenues and military capacity.

  • Financial sector and crypto: The EU is listing 94 Russian banks and major financial institutions, and an important figure in Russia's banking establishment. The EU is adding 4 designations related to the cross-border A7 network, including its new links to Africa.
  • Russian military-industrial complex (RMIC): As part of the 56 listings targeting the RMIC, 37 are directly linked to the production and supply chain of long-range drones.
  • Russia's shadow fleet enablers: 8 entities and 1 individual active in the shadow fleet ecosystem are designated, including companies operating on behalf of Russia's major oil companies and, for the first time, a crewing agency providing support to the shadow fleet.
  • Energy sector: The EU is designating 18 entities and 1 individual in the oil sector, including 3 refineries in Russia, a major Belarusian oil refinery, as well as a company created to sell Belarusian petroleum products within Russia.
  • Gold and diamond sectors: To target other means of revenue generation for Russia, 7 major actors in the gold sector, a leading diamond company, as well as several entities active in the mining and metallurgy sectors are being designated.
  • Critical infrastructure: The EU is exerting pressure on Russia's critical infrastructure, as the Council decided to designate a key cross-border energy supplier and a prominent figure of Russian Railways.
  • Russia's war propaganda machine: 8 individuals spreading Russia's war propaganda and contributing to its manipulative war narrative on Ukraine are designated.
  • Accountability for war crimes: To target individuals responsible for atrocious crimes, a Major General and war criminal is being designated who has engaged in the torture, executions, and desecration of bodies of Ukrainian military personnel, including prisoners of war.

These additions bring the number of individual listings related to actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine to almost 3000.

DE-LISTINGS

Why are financial entities de-listed

One of the objectives of EU sanctions policy is to trigger behavioural change and to encourage third countries to align with EU measures. When such change has occurred, the Commission considers it appropriate to acknowledge it and act accordingly. The Council decides unanimously whether an entity should be placed on a sanctions list. Removal from such a list is subject to the same procedure. The Commission is regularly in contact with third countries about listed entities subject to their jurisdiction with a view to finding a way forward that is in line with the objectives sought by the listing of the entity. When, according to our analysis, the conditions are met for such de-listings, this should be seen as a sign of success.

BELARUS ALIGNMENT

Which new measures concern Belarus?

The package mirrors the trade and, where necessary, certain financial measures and provisions adding legal protection for EU operators in the Belarus sanctions regime, per previous practice. The package adds four additional Belarusian entities to the list of entities that are part of or support Belarus's or Russia's defence and security sector. Even tighter export restrictions apply to these entities.

OTHER MEASURES

VISA RESTRICTIONS

The new measures introduce the legal basis for a comprehensive visa ban on Russian combatants. These individuals constitute a threat to the Union's values, fundamental interests and security or the international relations of a Member State or the Union as a whole, consistent with Russia's wider hybrid warfare strategies. The Council will decide when the ban is to enter into force. Once decided, individuals serving or having served in the Russian Armed Forces or in paramilitary groups affiliated with the Russian government that have directly contributed to the invasion of Ukraine through combat operations will no longer be issued with visas to travel to the EU.

For more information

Press release

European Commission website on Ukraine

Q&A on restrictive measures

EU Sanctions Helpdesk